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the American culture should be different or that America
should be more like France or any other country that hap-
pens to offer moral rights protection.' Instead, this paper
explains how the American perspective and existing laws
can be used to provide a more comprehensive scheme
of moral rights protection. 2 Specifically, the paper looks
at principles of negotiable instruments to reconcile moral
rights protection with the need for transferability of cre-
ative works in the United States.
"Moral rights" propose three basic inalienable
rights that adhere to authors of creative works.' These
include the right of disclosure, the right of attribution and
its associated right of anonymity, as well as the right of
integrity. The right of disclosure means that only the author
knows when a work is final and ready for public dissemi-
nation. Then, even after the work is disseminated to the
public, the author may demand recognition for his or her
work, refuse association, or remain anonymous. Finally, at
the core of the moral rights doctrine, is the right of integ-
rity.
4
The right of integrity protects the meaning and
spirit of a work and is based on the idea that creative works
reflect authors' individual personalities.' Like fingerprints,
no one personality is the same. If a creative work rep-
resents an author's personality, then protecting the integ-
The United States protects creativity, but only to
the extent that a final product has economic value. "0 The
United States gives authors economic incentives to pro-
duce creative works by granting them a bundle of copy-
rights. 1 For a limited time, authors have the exclusive
rights to display, distribute, perform, reproduce and prepare
derivative works based on the original. During this limited
time, authors have absolute control over their works, to
exploit the works or to prevent others from doing so. 2
Copyrights may be spliced in a number of ways,
allowing authors to maximize the financial returns on their
investments. 3 Authors may profit by selling a work or
licensing the right to use it. Authors may reap even larger
returns by selling the copyrights altogether. In the absence
of a contract stating otherwise, authors in the United States
retain no protection for moral rights. 14 Once most works
are sold, the new owner may use the work free and clear
without regard to the author's wishes, even if the use is
offensive or destroys the meaning and spirit of the work. "s
The only limitations on a buyer are outlined in the first sale
doctrine and the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA). 6
The first sale doctrine provides limited privileges
for buyers to distribute a copy (or other specified acts)
without infringing the copyright. 17 The first sale does not
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Ithe author. 6 Indeed, creativity is often more about self-
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transfer the copyrights or authorize the buyer to publicly
perform or modify the work or make multiple copies of the
work. By the same token, the first sale does not prohibit
any moral rights violations. 8 Unfortunately, authors have
little bargaining power to contract for ongoing interests
in a work, the only means by which an author may retain
moral rights in a work once it is transferred. '9 Regardless
of bargaining power, authors are likely to forfeit any moral
rights not expressly reserved in the contract and courts
look at customs of the trade to resolve ambiguities.2"
Alternatively, authors in America must turn to
VARA, federal legislation that is peculiarly narrow and
meaningless to the majority of authors and their creative
works. 2 Any moral rights that might be available under
VARA are subject to a penumbra of fair uses, expire














Visual Artist Frederick Hart created ExNihilo, a sculpture
depicting the author's spiritual search for god. The sculp-
ture was reproduced in a motion picture, The Devil's Advo-
cate, but was distorted to conjure ideas of incestuous rela-
tions. Hart was sorely pained, however, reproductions
were expressly excluded from scrutiny underVARA.2 s An
author's copyrights protect against the unauthorized repro-
duction of a work, but the only way to retain moral rights
protection for authorized reproductions is to withhold
such reproductions from distribution.
In the absence of any meaningful protection for
moral rights, American courts have attempted, where pos-
sible, to stretch existing laws to protect the integrity of
authors and their creative works. 2 Authors seeking vindi-
cation for moral rights violations have taken shelter under
the Lanham Act, which applies to trademarks and protects
against consumer confusion. 7 In Gilliam v.ABC, Inc., British
performers known as "Monty Python" prevailed over ABC
after alleging that ABC made substantial edits to Monty
Python's work for broadcast in violation of the Lanham Act.
By deleting those portions it deemed to be obscene, ABC
also deleted Monty Python's "rare brand of humor:' This
mutilation was said to have created a false impression in
the minds of the public as to the origin of Monty Python's
work. 28
While the Lanham Act indirectly protects moral
rights by prohibiting substantial departures from the origi-
nal work or false endorsements, it is not an effective source
of protection against constructed personas or objection-
able contextual uses. 29 Right-of-publicity statutes have
been used to protect moral rights, but only to the extent
that authors are famous and have a commercial interest in
their identities. 10 In White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc., a famous game-show host sued a technology company
for violating her right-of-publicity when it used her image
and likeness in a series of advertisements. The advertise-
ments featured robots that resembled Vanna White, how-
ever, she was neither consulted nor paid. After holding
that the advertisements "leave little doubt about the celeb-
rity," the court denied defendant's motion for summary judg-










less of fame, but
only in instances
of willful injury. "'
In Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, a
composer from the Soviet Union charged the defendant
with libel when it used the composer's music in a film
having an anti-soviet theme. The composer argued that
the film implied his approval and gave the impression that
he was being disloyal to his country. The court noted the
lack of any moral rights protection in the United States and
found in favor of the defendant after concluding that the
composer had failed to show the requisite infliction of a
willful injury.
Regardless of intent, libel and slander theories fail
to recognize that while the author's work is tied directly to
his or her reputation, it is entirely possible to destroy the
integrity of a work and ultimately the author's own integrity
without damaging the author's reputation. 3 2 The author's
right of integrity, apart from public opinion, refers to the
author's personal choice to align his or her actions, taken
in the form of creativity, with his or her personal values
and belief systems. Some authors choose not to identify
with their creations as a reflection of themselves. For many
authors, however, preserving personal integrity is the fuel
and primary source of motivation behind creative works,
regardless of any economic worth in the public eye.3" In
one instance, Artistic Director Dorothy Miln turned down
a substantial amount of money to direct a play after learning
COPYRIGHT
that the plot directed blame on others. She was unable to
support the play because she believes that persons should
look inward and take responsibility for their own actions or
inactions.
While Americans depend on economic stability to
earn a living, some of the world's greatest thinkers, econo-
mists included, were driven not by economic gain but by
more intrinsic values, such as the search for truth and integ-
rity. So why, then, does the United States refuse to offer
any meaningful moral rights protection? I propose that the
United States resists additional protection for moral rights
because it has not yet figured out how to offer such protec-
tion without hindering the transferability of creative prod-
ucts in the United States. 
4
inteUnie States
When asked about moral rights protection, many
Americans point out that it would allow authors to place
unreasonable restraints on creative works and fair trade. "
The notion that authors could create something, sell it
for value, and then reclaim it by asserting some unknown
''moral right" is almost offensive and seems more like fraud
than fair trade. 36 One case in France involved Bernhard
Buffet, who auctioned off an artistic refrigerator that he
had painted.3 After learning that the refrigerator had been
auctioned off again with all but one of its six panels missing,
Buffet was deeply offended and sued for damages. Buffet
alleged that reducing his artistic masterpiece to one panel
impaired the integrity of his work and violated his moral
rights. The court agreed. Another case involved James
McNeil Whistler, who painted a portrait commissioned
by Lord Eden. 38 Whistler completed the work but then
altered it and refused to transfer it to Lord Eden. The
French Court orderedWhistler to pay restitution and dam-
ages for his breach of contract. Whistler was not, however,
forced to restore the work or transfer it to Lord Eden.
While moral rights are integral to the legal system
in France, Americans refuse to follow suit. Americans fear
that if purchasers were not able to obtain creative prod-
ucts free and clear from authors' "whims," then creative
products would not be a benefit but a liability offering
little incentive to purchase the works in the first place. "
This would, of course, be devastating to the entertainment
industry and the United States economy at large.
4
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If creative works cannot be transferred freely, they
are of little economic value in the United States. In this
way, creative works are more like negotiable instruments.
It makes sense, then, to apply legal principles of negotiable
instruments to determine whether or not the United States
can reconcile moral rights protection with the transferabil-
ity of creative works in the United States. Specifically, we
must look to the Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine.
Negotiable Instruments are equivalent to cash and
can be transferred freely from one party to the next.4' This
is achieved by shifting liability away from innocent parties
who take an instrument for value in good faith and without
knowledge of any problems.42 These innocent parties are
known as holders in due course and have super-plaintiff pri-
ority in the value of the instrument.
To understand how the holder-in-due-course doc-
trine works, it is useful to think of a check. A check is a type
of negotiable instrument, which is equivalent to cash and
can be transferred freely from one party to the next. The
instrument can be used to pay off a debt or purchase some-
thing of value, such as a new car. The merchant who takes
the check may then use the same instrument, like cash,
to pay a third party for its own debt or something else
of value, such as new inventory at the car dealership. So
long as the check is taken for value in good faith and with-
out notice of any problems, the holder is a holder in due
course. As a holder in due course, who takes the check
for value in good faith and without knowledge, the third-
party merchant is entitled to use or enforce the check free
from liability regardless of any problems between the origi-
nal parties, such as the sale of a defective car. The third-
party merchant would not, however, be entitled to enforce
the check or be relieved from liability for subsequent deal-
ings if the merchant took the check with knowledge of such
a problem.
In an actual case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the trial judge's finding in favor of the plaintiff
as a holder-in-due-course of a note signed by defendants,
Anthony and Dolores Angelini. 43 The defendants, who later
became insolvent, hired a contractor for home repairs and
signed a note for $5,363.40 plus interest in exchange for
the services. Although the note did not specify a date,
defendants understood that payments would begin upon
completion of the work.44 The contractor transferred the
note to plaintiff, a home improvement contract financier.
Plaintiff purchased the note, which stated the work was
complete, but failed to request a certificate of completion
beforehand. Had the plaintiff requested a certificate of
completion, as was routinely done in the industry, it would
have learned that the repairs were not in fact sufficiently
complete so as to trigger defendants' obligation on the
note. As a result, plaintiff was charged with notice and
barred from enforcing the note as a holder in due course
with super-plaintiff priority.
4
Another case illustrates the interface between
the holder-in-due-course notice requirements and creative
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works specifically.46 In Menzel v. List, the owner of a Marc
Chagall painting sued a subsequent buyer and third party
vendor to recover the painting, which had been stolen by
German authorities during World War II. At some point,
a Parisian art gallery purchased the painting and sold it to
the owners of a New York art gallery.47 The plaintiff suc-
cessfully recovered the painting from List, the subsequent
buyer, however, List in turn recovered damages from the
third party vendor in New York on the basis of a breach
of an implied warranty when failing to inquire as to the
painting's history before purchasing it.48
Vt -ratv Work as
The Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine, subject to
controlling federal and state statutes, can also be used to
protect moral rights while promoting the transferability of
creative works in the United States. If we protect moral
rights, creative works can be transferred freely by shifting
liability for moral rights violations away from innocent par-
ties who take the creative work for value in good faith
and without knowledge of any problems. For example, an
author offers to sell a creative work to a buyer on the con-
dition that the buyer agrees not to modify the work or use
it in connection with advertisements in motion pictures.
The author introduces himself as the founder of"Consum-
ers Against Advertising in Motion Pictures" and explains
how his work criticizes Corporate America. The buyer may
decline the offer, but once the buyer accepts, he or she
must respect the author's moral right to disassociate him-
self and the work from advertisements in motion pictures.
In the context of transferability, we want to know
what happens when the buyer transfers the work to a third
party but then forgets to explain the author's aversion to
advertisements in the motion picture industry. Let us also
assume that the third party is a director who has spent
more than 3 million dollars to use the author's work in
an advertisement that will be featured in an upcoming film.
Should the third party incur liability for a moral rights vio-
lation? What if the third party knew of the author and
his aversion at the time of purchase? What if the third
party was also leading an effort to shut down "Consumers
Against Advertising in Motion Pictures?"
In the first scenario, the third party is an innocent
party who has purchased the author's work from the ini-
tial buyer for value in good faith and without knowledge
of any problems because the third party does not know
the author, and the initial buyer has failed to mention the
author's restrictions. In the second scenario, the third party
has purchased the author's work from the initial buyer for
value but with notice of a possible conflict. This would
trigger the third party's duty to inquire about the conflict
before purchasing the work and investing substantial sums
of money in the advertisement. In the last scenario, the
third party knowingly stands in direct opposition to the
author's moral position and has acted in bad faith by pur-
chasing the work specifically for advertisements in motion
pictures.
Using the Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine, authors
may reclaim a work even after it is sold but only if the
holder knew or had reason to know of the alleged moral
right at the time he or she purchased the work. This
accomplishes the goal of protecting moral rights while pre-
serving the transferability of creative works in the United
States. Putting the burden on the author to define and
pronounce moral rights interests early on, so as to give
notice to subsequent buyers, allows subsequent purchas-
ers to make more informed business decisions. As a result,
subsequent purchasers and the entertainment industry as
a whole will continue to purchase creative works without
the risk of broad-based moral rights claims that have no
merit.
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